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I conduct two experiments to examine the effects of different types of stress on 
individuals’ willingness to cooperate.  The experience of stress is characterized by the 
primary cognitive appraisal of threat.  It activates the emotion of anxiety and induces 
stress coping behaviors.  I posit that because different types of stress differ in terms of the 
secondary dimension of cognitive appraisal, the responsibility of possible failure, they 
lead to different stress coping behaviors in collaborative contexts.  Based on the 
attribution of threat, I classify stress into two types, ego and external stress.  Under ego 
stress, the possible failure is attributed to one’s capabilities.  Ego stressors, such as lack 
of skill, cause individuals to worry about their capabilities, posing a threat to goal 
achievement.  I argue that ego stress motivates an individual to seek affiliations for joint 
protection.  I provide experimental evidence that ego stress increases cooperation.  Under 
external stress, on the other hand, the possible failure is attributed to factors in the 
environment.  External stressors, such as environmental uncertainty, cause individuals to 
worry about threat related factors in the environment, which also may hinder goal 
achievement.  I argue that external stress motivates people to avoid risks, including the 










The success of work teams in organizations is determined by the cooperation of 
team members (Tyler and Blader 2000; Young et al. 1993).  Many studies have 
investigated methods of promoting cooperation from formal and informal control 
perspectives (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Arya et al. 1997; Coletti et al. 2005; Itoh 
1991; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1991; Rankin 2004; Rankin and Sayre 2000; Rowe 
2004; Tayler and Bloomfield 2011).  From a formal control perspective, to establish or 
maintain cooperation using economic incentives requires that companies obtain 
information on individuals’ contributions (Towry 2003).  However, acquiring such 
information is often too costly.  Therefore, researchers began to investigate informal 
control mechanisms, which rely on employees’ social motives such as trust (Coletti et al. 
2005) and norm compliance (Tayler and Bloomfield 2011).  Along these lines, social 
psychology research suggests stress (i.e., a threatening or noxious psychological and 
physiological state) may influence cooperation (Lazarus 1993).  Therefore, such an effect 
may be a potential informal control mechanism.  
It is important to examine the effect of stress in a collaborative context because 
stress is pervasive, with 83 percent of employed adults in the United States affected by it 
(Interactive 2013).  In the workplace, stress is induced by various personal, task, and 
environmental factors, or stressors.  The objective of this study is to investigate the effect 
of stressors on cooperation.  Specifically, I classify stressors into two types and propose 
that they influence cooperation differently.   
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According to social psychology research, the evaluative thoughts of situations, or 
cognitive appraisals, dictate the emotional experience and coping behaviors (Lazarus 
1993). Stressful situations are characterized by the primary cognitive appraisal of threat, 
which activates the emotion of anxiety.  Anxiety is an aversive emotional state 
characterized by agitation, tension, and trouble in mind (Tyrer 1999).  It is caused by the 
threat to a current goal (i.e., the source of anxiety) (Epstein 1973).  In order to achieve the 
goal, anxiety motivates individuals to develop compensating strategies (or stress coping 
behaviors) to reduce the threat (for a review, see Eysenck 1992).  Moreover, the 
motivating effect of anxiety spills over to tasks that are incidental to the source of the 
anxiety, and increases the use of compensating strategies in these tasks (Forgas 1995; 
Raghunathan and Pham 1999).  In this study, I argue that factors in the workplace induce 
anxiety, which increases the use of compensating strategies in collaborative contexts.  
The compensating strategy in such contexts remains unknown: the stress coping literature 
provides conflicting arguments in terms of the effect of stress on cooperation.   
I further argue that the specific stress coping behavior (i.e., to cooperate or not to 
cooperate) is dictated by a secondary cognitive appraisal, the responsibility of possible 
failure. Specifically, the threat of failure to achieve a goal may be attributed to one’s own 
capability or to threat-related factors in the environment.  Based on such differences, I 
classify stressors into two types, ego and external stressors.  For ego stressors, the threat 
of failure of achieving one’s goal is attributed to individuals’ inability to meet task 
demands.  Examples of ego stressor are skill deficiency and performance feedback.  For 
external stressors, the threat of failure is attributed to threat related external factors in the 
environment. Examples of external stressors are uncertainty in the business environment 
 3 
or within organizations. These stressors cause individuals to worry about threat related 
factors in the environment that may negatively impact one’s goal achievement.   
I posit that different types of stressors lead to different choices of coping options.  
As defined, ego stress causes individuals to worry about their own capability.  I expect 
that in situations with high levels of ego stress, the feeling of lack of personal competence 
motivates individuals to seek help and protection, which can be obtained via affiliation.  
As a result, an individual is more willing to cooperate when the level of ego stress is high 
than when it is low.  As defined, external stress causes an individual to worry about 
external factors.  It motivates individuals to reduce the threat related factors and avoid 
exposure to relational risk.  As a result, individuals are less willing to cooperate when the 
level of external stress is high than when it is low. 
I conduct two experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to investigate 
the effect of ego and external stressors on cooperation, respectively.  Both studies have a 
1×2 between-participant design, in which I manipulate the level of stress (high and low).  
To operationalize the independent variable, participants complete a directed-writing task, 
in which they describe a stressful (or not stressful) experience in their life.  To 
operationalize the dependent variable of cooperation, participants are randomly paired to 
play a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with monetary incentives, immediately following the 
completion of the directed-writing task.  Specifically, in experiment one, I manipulate the 
high (low) level of ego stress by requiring people to write about their weaknesses 
(strengths) in terms of skills that they are most worried (content) about.  I find that 
participants in the high ego stress condition are more cooperative than participants in the 
low ego stress condition.  In experiment two, I manipulate the high (low) level of external 
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stress by requiring participants to write about situations that they feel the most uncertain 
(certain) in their life.  I find that participants in the high external stress condition are less 
cooperative than those in the low external stress condition. 
My study makes a few contributions to the literature.  First, my study extends the 
psychology literature by examining the effect of stress on group cooperation. The stress 
literature identifies two categories of stress coping behaviors, fight-or-flight and tend-
and-befriend.  The former suggests that stress increases risk avoidant behaviors, which 
hints that stress may reduce individuals’ willingness to undertake relational risk, and as a 
result, decrease cooperation.   The latter suggests that stress may enhance the need for 
affiliations, and therefore, increase cooperation.  I reconcile these conflicting predictions 
by classifying stressors into two categories: ego and external stressors. I provide evidence 
that they influence cooperation differently.  Specifically, ego stressors are factors that 
cause individuals to worry about their own capabilities. They increase cooperation by 
motivating an individual to seek affiliations for joint protection.  External stressors are 
factors that cause individuals to worry about threat related factors in the environment. 
They reduce cooperation by motivating people to avoid relational risks. 
Second, by identifying unique motives of cooperation, this study helps 
management accountants understand antecedences of cooperative behaviors in the 
workplace.  In the management accounting literature, previous studies have examined 
many economic and social motives of cooperation. Unlike these studies, my dissertation 
introduces another category of factors, emotion, which influences cooperation.  
Specifically, stress affects cooperation due to unconscious motivating mechanism, in 
which individuals engage in certain behaviors because such behaviors make decision 
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makers feel better.  Understanding such motives provides researchers and practitioners a 
better understanding of antecedences of cooperation in work teams.  
Third, my studies suggest that stress constitute an additional informal control 
mechanism. Based on the results of my study, it may be inferred that contextual factors 
and management accounting tools influence cooperation due to the induced stress.  
Previous studies in the management literature identified many stressors in the workplace 
(e.g., Murphy 1995).  In this paper, I review and discuss these stressors in the context of 
management accounting.  I also provide theories to classify these stressors and predict 
their influences on cooperation.  This study extends the literature that investigates the 
effect of personal, task and environmental variables on incentive mechanisms in 
management accounting (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002).  These effects are informal control 
mechanisms in the workplace.    
Fourth, this research has practical implications for designing control systems in 
organizations.  Companies make tradeoffs between the cost of investing in formal control 
mechanism and the cost of low productivity as a result of free-riding.  By understanding 
the effects of situational factors on cooperation, organizations may identify situations in 
which the rate of free-riding is relatively high or low.  The control systems may be 
designed accordingly. The strength of formal control system needs to be higher in 
situations with high free-riding rate than in situations with low free-riding rate.  For 
example, in accounting teams, where tasks are relatively difficult (high ego stress) and 
the environment is not very turbulent (low external stress), cooperation levels can be 
relatively high even without formal control mechanisms.  In contrast, in sales teams, 
where tasks are relatively easy (low ego stress) and performance is highly influenced by 
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market conditions (high external stress), cooperation levels may be relatively low without 
formal control mechanisms.  In such cases, to promote cooperation, companies may need 
to incur costs to acquire information regarding individuals’ effort level.  With such 
information, companies can use formal control to increase cooperation.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  In Chapter II, I discuss 
prior literature. In Chapter III, I provide theoretical background and develop my research 
hypotheses.  In Chapter VI, I report the pretest results of my research instrument. In 
Chapter V, I describe the research method and results of experiment one, used to test 
hypothesis 1.  In Chapter VI, I report the research method and results of experiment two, 





2.1 Cooperation in a Collaborative Context 
In a collaborative context, motivating employees to exert effort, or to cooperate, is 
an important issue in the incentive contracting literature of management accounting 
(Sprinkle 2003).  In collaborative contexts, individual contributions cannot be easily 
identified; therefore, individuals are usually compensated based on the output of team 
production.  As a result, such contracts do not provide an economic incentive for agents 
to exert effort, but instead cause the free-rider problem (Holmstrom 1982).  The opposite 
of taking a free ride is cooperation, which means that all team members exert effort 
toward a group goal.  Below, I briefly discuss theories and evidence related to the 
willingness to cooperate from the perspectives of economic motives, social motives and 
emotion. 
2. 1.1 Economic Incentive  
The cause of the free-rider problem is the lack of economic incentives for agents 
to exert effort in the collaborative context.  In this section, I first explain game theory 
models and experimental evidence, which identify the free-rider problem.  I then discuss 
formal control mechanisms which aim to improve cooperation from the economic 
perspective. 
Game theory sheds light on the incentive issue in group incentive contracts.  The 
conflict of interests in such contexts is captured by both the Prisoners’ Dilemma game 
and the Public Goods game.  In both games, each agent knows that the payoff will be the 
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highest for him/herself if everyone else works, but he or she chooses to shirk.  
Accordingly, the Nash Equilibrium for both games is for all players to choose low 
effort/contribution level.1  In such contexts, the probability that an individual will shirk is 
termed relational risk.  For an individual, such risk is originated from other people’s 
behavior and is unique to the collaboration context (e.g., Das and Teng 1996, 1999, 
2001).  Therefore, it is different from other types of economic risk, which is determined 
by the realization of a random event.  Based on the game theoretic prediction, the 
relational risk is extremely high (i.e., individuals chose to shirk with 100% probability).  
Below, I discuss different variations of the game, including the one-shot interaction, 
infinitely repeated interaction and the finitely repeated interaction.  I briefly review both 
theoretical predictions and experimental evidence.     
In one-shot public good experiments, the results partially support the free rider 
problem.  Marwell and Ames (1981) conducted an experiment with different group sizes, 
for different monetary stakes, for participants playing the game for the first time, and 
after a previous experiment.  On average, participants contribute 40 to 60 percent of their 
stake to the public good.  This experiment has been replicated by other researchers (e.g., 
Andreoni and Miller 1993).  Such results demonstrate that some people get a “free ride” 
while others do not.  Therefore, although the free-riding issue is not as problematic as 
theoretically predicted, a considerable portion of participants do take a free-ride.   
Repeated interaction has the potential to improve cooperation under some 
circumstances, but does not solve the cooperation issue entirely.  The effects differ 
                                                 
 
 
1 The difference between two games is that while PD games usually involve two players, the Public Goods 
Game usually involves multiple players. 
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between infinitely and finitely repeated interactions.  For infinitely repeated games, 
theoretical equilibria can be reached that each agent exerts high effort all the time, when 
certain strategies are used.  For example, in an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
players may use the Grim Trigger Strategy, in which a player cooperates until the other 
defects and then the player defects forever (Axelrod 1984).  This strategy yields Nash 
Equilibrium in which both players cooperate forever if players do not discount the future 
too much.  As another example, in the strategy of Tit for Tat, a player will first cooperate, 
then subsequently replicate an opponent's previous action.  Any person who adopts such 
strategy is expected to receive higher payoffs than those who do not adopt it (Axelrod 
1984).   
Experimental studies simulated infinite interaction with random continuation rules 
and provide evidence that partially supports the prediction that infinitely repeated 
interaction increases cooperation.  For example, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) compared 
a one-shot game with infinitely repeated games with a probability of continuation of 0.9 
and found that the latter leads to more cooperation than the former.  The percentage of 
contribution increased from 29 to 40 percent.  Dal Bo (2005) provides evidence that the 
greater the probabilities of future interaction, the more likely participants choose to 
cooperate.  Above all, empirical evidence partially supports the theoretical argument that 
infinitely repeated interaction improves cooperation.2  However, in practice infinite 
                                                 
 
 
2 Perfect cooperation in every period is never reached in the laboratory, which could be attributable to 
methodological issues of the continuation rule. According to this rule, participants can calculate an 
expected number of rounds in the experiment instead of considering the game to be infinite. Therefore, 
punishments are not credible and the future casts no shadow. 
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interaction is not possible.  A more common scenario is finite interaction with the 
opportunity of reputation building.   
With regard to finitely repeated games, theoretically if a stage game has a unique 
Nash equilibrium, then the repeated game has a unique sub-game perfect outcome: the 
defection equilibrium (i.e., each player defects in the game) will be played in every stage 
as a result of backward induction.  Several experiments showed that cooperation declines 
sharply after a few repetitions in a finite repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Kim and Walker 
1984; Isaac et al. 1984; Isaac et al.1985).3  In these games, reputation building or 
signaling has the potential of improving cooperation.   That is to say, a participant can 
take cooperative actions repetitively to build a reputation as someone who always 
cooperates.  If the opponent understands and coordinates, a cooperative equilibrium may 
be reached.4  The reputation building argument is supported by experimental evidence 
(Andreoni and Miller 1993; Bolton et al. 2005).  For example, Bolton et al. (2005) 
showed that even with high costs, providing information about a partner’s immediate past 
action increases cooperation.  Recursive reputation information of previous partners 
further promotes cooperation, regardless of the cost of cooperation.   
                                                 
 
 
3 One leading theoretical explanation is that cooperation in finitely repeated in Prisoner’s Dilemma games 
arises due to the presence of incomplete information regarding the utility function of a rival (Kreps et al. 
1982).  The power of the study—that a small belief that an opponent will cooperate—is enough to support 
considerable cooperative play even when all players are purely self-interested. 
4 In order for this to work, however, players must believe that in the beginning of the game, the other player 
is likely to behave in this way. Another requirement for the signal to operate is that players have some 
incentive to signal. Signaling is undertaken only with a substantial cost:  both immediate cost and strategic 
cost.  The immediate cost is the failure to make a play that represents an optimal response to an opponent’s 
expected actions in the next few periods.  Strategic cost may arise if the opponent’s long run response to 
the signal is adverse.  The last requirement for signaling and reputation building is that players must be 
willing to probe their opponents to learn about the strategies they are playing.  For example, in order for a 
player to establish a reputation for using a “Tit For Tat” strategy, her opponent must be willing to 
investigate this possibility by playing cooperatively for at least a few periods.  If an opponent adopts a 
“Grim Strategy,” signaling will not work (Watson 1996).   
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Above all, both theory and experimental evidence suggests that the free-rider 
issue cannot be eliminated in various types of agent interactions.  Therefore, many 
management accounting researchers seek to investigate the effectiveness of various 
control systems in improving cooperation in collaborative contexts.  The most traditional 
form of control mechanism is the formal control of monitoring.  I discuss a few economic 
models of monitoring below. 
The first control system in the literature is investigated by Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972), who argue that the individual who monitors team member’s inputs should be the 
residual claimant.  This ensures incentive compatibility of monitors because the 
monitoring activity itself is non-contractible.  However, monitoring by a principal or 
specialist can be very costly or even impossible.  In fact, if principals could obtain 
contractible information as to agents’ effort levels, they are better off contracting on 
individual effort and contribution because of the risk-averse nature of agents.  
The second approach is the mutual monitoring among agents.  Holmstrom (1982) 
demonstrates that efficient or near-efficient outcomes may be achieved by making team 
members residual claimants on the effects of their actions, while not conferring 
ownership rights on them. Groups of workers often have much better information about 
their individual contributions than the employer is able to gather. Group incentives then 
motivate the employees to monitor one another and to encourage effort provision or other 
appropriate behavior.  That is to say, peer monitoring can help the principal to extract 
private information and, at the same time, save the cost of supervisory or third party 
monitoring (Milgrom and Roberts 1992).   
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Researchers investigated two forms of peer monitoring: vertical monitoring and 
horizontal monitoring.  The former relies on vertical communication from agent to 
principal, the latter relies on team self-management.  For vertical monitoring, each agent 
observes the other agent’s action and reports to the principal.  Each agent’s payoff is 
based on reports filed by other group members.  The effectiveness of such monitoring 
mechanism depends on whether agents will choose strategies independently, because 
coordination among them can undermine the reliability of their reports.  Itoh (1993) 
proved that due to collusion there exists no revelation mechanism which improves the 
principal’s welfare.  Another form of peer monitoring is horizontal monitoring, which 
relies on team self-management and peer-based control.  In contrast to the vertical 
approach, the horizontal monitoring system induces agents to agree to take actions 
desired by the principal.  Such agreement is implemented either explicitly or implicitly 
through formal sanctions, peer pressure, or enforceable side contracting (Itoh 1993; Arya 
et al. 1997; Che and Yoo 2001; Gibbons and Murphy 1992).  However, the horizontal 
monitoring system requires that agents have access to ex post perfect information, which 
is impractical.  To sum up, due to information asymmetry, neither vertical nor horizontal 
monitoring mechanism can successfully and practically be implemented to solve the 
cooperation problem completely.  
2.1.2 Social Motives 
Besides economic motives explained above, many social motives also influence 
people’s cooperative behavior.  Researchers have investigated the implication of these 
motives and identified mechanisms that enhance cooperation because of individuals’ 
social motives.  In this section, I discuss these social motives and then review studies 
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which show that contextual factors influence cooperation due to employees’ social 
motives. 
Cooperation is influenced by many social motives, including altruism, reciprocity, 
trust, norm compliance and ethical and fairness concerns.  In the experimental economics 
literature, altruism and reciprocity are first used to explain why people cooperate.  
Altruism means that people are motivated by taking pleasure in others’ pleasure or by 
“doing the right thing,” which means the satisfaction of conscience or ethical mandates 
(Anderoni 1995; Anderoni and Miller 1993; Cooper et al. 1996).  Many experiments 
reveal that a considerable portion of people understands the free-riding problem, but 
choose to engage in cooperation behavior due some form of kindness (Anderoni 1995).  
Such behaviors are also observed when reputation building is controlled (Anderoni and 
Miller 1993; Cooper et al. 1996).  
With respect to reciprocity, researchers have identified two types: weak and 
strong reciprocity.  Weak reciprocity is the cooperative behavior in accordance with self-
interest rule.  Weak reciprocity includes strategic reputation building behavior and best 
response cooperative behavior, which was discussed in the previous section.  Strong 
reciprocity is the willingness to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even 
when such behavior cannot be justified in terms of self-interest (Gintis 2000; Carpenter et 
al. 2009).  One form of strong reciprocity is the behavior in response to generosity.  This 
has been discussed extensively in the gift exchange literature (e.g., Berg et al. 1995).  
This literature has shown that generous behavior often induces reciprocal responses.  
Recipients of a gift frequently respond by being generous to those who give the gift.  
While such behavior is rational in a repeated setting of efficient wage theory, results in a 
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single shot game lend strong support to the argument of strong reciprocity (Fehr et al. 
1996).  Another form of strong reciprocity is the behavior to punish unfair behavior, 
which is observed in numerous ultimatum game experiments (e.g., Guth and Tietz 1990; 
Roth 1995; Camerer and Thaler 1995).  The results of these experiments suggest that 
people are frequently willing to forego some money in order to punish unfair behavior. 
Another construct that helps understand cooperation is trust.  In most definitions, 
trust is the immediate precursor of risk taking behavior or the psychological state before 
risk taking behavior.  Trust involves two important components:  positive expectations of 
the intentions of behavior of another individual (Lewicki and Bunker 1996) and the 
willingness to be vulnerable (Mayer et al. 1995).  Positive expectations of the intentions 
of behavior of another individual are related to trustors’ perceptions about the motives 
underlying trustees’ behavior (Smith and Barclay 1997).  Positive perceptions cause 
trustors to believe that they will receive good treatments, leading to a willingness to 
engage in cooperative behaviors (Gambetta 1988; Kramer et al. 1996).  With regard to 
willingness to be vulnerable, inherent in it is the relational risk, which is one condition 
considered essential in psychological sociological and economic conceptualizations of 
trust (Coleman 1990; Rotter 1967; Williamson 1993).  For example, Rousseau et al. 
(1998) describes a reciprocal relationship between trust and risk taking: risk creates an 
opportunity for trust, which leads to risk taking.  
Cooperation is also affected by other factors, such as team identity (Rowe 2004), 
histories and norms (Nalbantian and Schotter 1997; Taylor and Bloomfield 2011), ethical 
concerns (Salterio and Webb 2006), and perceived fairness (Zhang 2008).  Besides their 
direct affects, some of these factors may impact cooperation indirectly by influencing 
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trust and/or reciprocity.  For example, team identity and social norm affect cooperation 
by changing trust, which in turn influences cooperation.  As another example, perceived 
fairness is the motive for negative reciprocity, which changes willingness to cooperate by 
changing the utility of choosing to cooperate.  
Due to the strong influence of these factors on cooperation, many researchers seek 
to account for such effects in the design of control systems.  They have identified 
situational variables, which influence cooperation due to social motives.  First of all, 
beyond its economic effects, the formal control mechanism impacts cooperation because 
it influences trust and norms compliance.  In terms of the relationship between formal 
control and trust, some scholars argue that this relationship is substitutionary (i.e., control 
decreases trust), while others argue that it is complementary (i.e., control enhances trust).  
Proponents of the substitutionary relationship argue that the control system signals 
distrust because of the incompatibility between control and positive expectations about 
the intentions of another party. A large body of research indicates that the implementation 
of formal controls serves as a signal of mistrust on the part of the controlling party (e.g., 
Curral and Judge 1995; Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Das and Teng 1998; Malhotra and 
Murnighan 2002).  Moreover, according to attribution theory, when a collaborator 
cooperates, other collaborators may attribute the cooperation either to the person’s innate 
trustworthiness (a dispositional characteristic) or to the fact that there is a control system 
in place (a situational characteristic). Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) find that 
cooperation in the presence of a control system is attributed, at least partially, to the 
constraints imposed by the control system. Therefore, control systems inhibit the 
development of trust. 
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The complementary point of view, on the other hand, argues that trust and control 
can be mutually reinforcing and contribute to the level of cooperation needed in a 
relationship (Sitkin 1995; Zucker 1986).  For example, Coletti et al. (2005) provide 
evidence that a strong control system can enhance the level of trust among collaborators.  
This increased trust, in turn, has a positive effect on the subsequent level of cooperation 
among collaborators.  This finding suggests that control induced cooperation engenders 
trust and generates an increasing marginal benefit of the control system. 
Formal controls also influence norm compliance and affect cooperation.  Taylor 
and Bloomfield (2011) provide evidence that formal controls affect cooperation due to a 
direct influence on personal norms and an indirect influence on descriptive norms.  This 
study takes a dynamic approach and documents that norm compliance effects persist even 
after the controls are changed, so that cooperative behavior can be strongly influenced by 
past control strength. 
Besides the control system, various institutional factors also influences social 
motives of cooperation.  These factors include task interdependence, accounting 
structure, and team design.  Task interdependence may influence cooperation in both 
directions.  On the one hand, high task interdependence implies low identifiability of 
individual effort, which decreases cooperation (e.g., Harkins and Petty 1982; Weldon and 
Gargano 1988; Williams et al. 1981).  On the other hand, it implies high mutual 
observability of agents’ effort, which increases cooperation (Liden et al. 2004).  As 
another example, accounting report structure, which creates a “group frame,” is 
demonstrated to complement team structure and to mitigate the free-rider problem (Rowe 
2004).  Lastly, cooperation is also influenced by team identity (Towry 2003).  High level 
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of team identify shift individuals’ attention to joint rather than individual outcomes 
(Brewer 1979). Team members who share high team identity believe that outcomes can 
be influenced by collective rather than individuals actions.  Therefore, they will 
coordinate their actions.   
2.1.3 Emotion 
Most of the previously reviewed studies take the cognitive approach, also called 
the consequentialist approach.  Specifically, economic models assume that people choose 
different courses of action based on the desirability of their consequences or “utility.”  
Behavioral decision research that incorporates social motives have generally adhered to 
the consequentialist perspective, but modify assumptions about sources of utility, 
weighting, time discounting or the form of the utility function.  However, in recent years, 
many studies point out that emotion plays a significant role in decision making in the 
field of social psychology (e.g., Epstein 1994; Wilson et al. 2000) and decision science 
(e.g., Slovic et al. 2002; Peters and Slovic 2000; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Lerner and 
Keltner 2000, 2001).  Specifically, decision making may follow an alternative process, 
which is simple, reactive and fast (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). This type of decision 
process is called an affective or automatic process.  In contrast, the consequentialist 
approach is called the deliberative and controlled process, which is complex, reflective 
and slow. 
In terms of the influence of affect on individuals’ decision making in social 
contexts, most studies in the current literature used paper and pencil tasks to elicit 
individuals’ willingness to act pro-socially in hypothetical scenarios.  The early research 
dichotomizes the affective experience in terms of its valence (positive or negative) and 
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documents that positive affect increases pro-social behaviors, such as helping (e.g., 
Carlson et al. 1988; George 1991).  The effects may be driven by various mechanisms, 
including a change of attentional focus, an increase of self-awareness, use of an 
alternative decision process, an amelioration of social outlook, a need to maintain 
positive mood or concomitant factors.  Later studies investigate specific emotions and 
find that various emotions which have the same valence influence cooperation 
differently.  As an example, Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) suggest that emotions of happy, 
gratitude and anger influence trust.  By comparison, the same study suggests emotions of 
pride, guilt and sadness do not influence trust because the appraisal of these emotions is 
not consistent with the judgment task.  The theory behind such phenomenon is that 
emotions are misattributed to the target being evaluated.  Emotions are more likely to be 
misattributed when the appraisals of the emotion are consistent with the judgment task 
than when the appraisals of the emotion are inconsistent with the judgment task.   
Recent evidence in the social psychology literature hints that cooperation may be 
influenced by stress.  Because stress is induced by many factors in the workplace, I seek 
to investigate the relationship between stressors and cooperation.  In the next section, I 
describe various stressors in the workplace.  
2.2 Stress and Management Accounting  
Stress is disturbance to one’s psychological and physiological equilibrium (Kobell 
1995).  It arises when an individual’s perceived ability is inadequate for the demand of a 
task.  Although perception of a situation may differ across individuals due to differences 
in personal attributes, characteristics of the workplace contribute to the stress experience 
(Colligan and Higgins 2005). Workers are especially prune to experience stress in what is 
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called a toxic work environment.  Toxic workplaces are characterized by “relentless 
demands, extreme pressure, and brutal ruthlessness (Macklem 2005).”  This type of 
workplace often involves high work demands and over-controlling/harassing 
environments (Karasek and Theorell 1990; Mausner-Dorsch and Eaton 2000).  Murphy 
(1995) describes five categories of factors that contribute to stress in the workplace: (1) 
factors unique to the job, (2) role in the organization, (3) career development, (4) 
interpersonal work relationships and (5) organizational structure/climate. Many factors 
within these five categories are determined by management accounting practice or are 
important in the context of management accounting practice. I discuss factors in these 
categories and their relations to management accounting practice in detail. 
The first category is “factors unique to the job.”  This category includes workload, 
work hours, work pace, physical environment and autonomy of workers, isolation from 
other workers and the meaningfulness of job (Murphy, 1995).  For example, Kantowitz 
(1987) describes a multidimensional model indicating that stress is influenced by a 
combination of work demands (task number, type, difficulty and contextual factors) as 
well as individual factors (coping capacity, willingness to expend effort, values, motives 
and strategies).   
Workload may be classified into quantitative overload and qualitative overload. 
The former refers to having too much work to perform, while the latter refers to the 
perceived deficiency in terms of skill (French and Caplan 1972).  Qualitative overload 
may cause individual to experience the feeling of inadequacy and dissatisfaction. Such an 
effect is especially likely to occur for new professionals (DeZoort and Lord 1997).  
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Related to workload, time pressure is another factor in this category.  Time 
deadline pressure and time constraint pressure arise when employees have to complete 
tasks by specific points in time.  Time deadline pressure influences 55 percent of survey 
respondents based on a survey conducted by American Anxiety Disorder Association 
(AADA 2006).  Such pressure is especially common among auditors.  For example, 
auditors must file regulatory reports or approve a client management’s release of earnings 
by a certain date.  As another example, auditors are required to finish a physical 
inventory count by a specific date (DeZoort and Lord 1997).  
As another example, incentive contracts influence economic motives of 
employees and create stress.  Some forms of incentive contracts imply that the economic 
welfare of employees is determined by their task performance.  Because employees have 
a motive to maximize their economic benefit, they worry about their performance and 
factors that may impact their performance.  As a result, they become stressed.  The stress 
is highly influenced by the forms of incentive contracts.  For example, performance 
contingent contracts, such as relative performance contracts and piece rate contracts, are 
more stressful than fixed wage contracts due to economic incentives.  Moreover, 
depending on the magnitude of the incentive and the expectancy of employees’ 
probability of receiving the incentives, economic incentives are expected to induce 
different levels of stress. 
Besides economic motives, employees have social motives.  Feedback imposes 
stress because individuals have social motives such as maintaining a positive self-image 
or social-image.  Feedback influences stress because individuals anticipate that their 
performance will be evaluated by others within the company (DeZoort and Lord 1997).  
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Feedback has a direct impact on maintaining self-esteem and can influence individuals’ 
psychological wellbeing (Schuler 1985).  Anticipating or having received highly positive 
feedback can induce stress because of heightened expectations.  Anticipating or having 
received highly negative feedback can induce stress because of its effect on employee 
motivation (DeZoort and Lord 1997).  In an organization, feedback may be formal or 
informal (DeZoort and Lord 1997).  Both forms of feedback are influenced by the 
management information system. While formal feedback is collected and distributed via 
the management accounting system, informal feedback may be influenced by 
management accounting policy, such as the openness or the transparency of the 
information system.  For example, if employee performance information is available to 
others, it increases the chances of receiving and anticipating informal feedback.  
The second category of factors that contribute to stress in the workplace refers to 
employees’ “role in the organization.”  This category involves situations where 
employees have multiple responsibilities.  Employees usually perform multiple functions 
and require supervision from multiple supervisors.  Some roles may be ambiguous, 
incompatible or competing (Murphy 1995).  Accounting research has investigated 
pressures caused by role ambiguity, role conflict and perceived environmental 
uncertainty.  Role ambiguity refers to pressure resulting from a lack of understanding 
regarding one’s exact role within the organization. Such lack of understanding may 
involve inadequate information regarding role expectations, the means to meet 
expectations and the consequence of role performance (Van Sell et al. 1981). As an 
example, in management accounting contexts, employees are usually evaluated on their 
performance across multiple dimensions using the balanced scorecard.  Due to the 
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complex nature of such situations, employees may not know how to make tradeoffs 
among these dimensions to maximize the welfare of self and the company (Farrell et al. 
2008).  Such situations cause individuals to experience stress.  
Role conflict refers to the incongruity of expectations associated with a role 
(DeZoort and Lord 1997).  Role conflict arises when individuals experience at least two 
incompatible role pressures simultaneously (Bamber et al. 1989; Wolfe and Snoek 1962).  
For example, in public a accounting context, an auditor is accountable to multiple parties, 
including clients and supervisors, who have different preferences for performance 
(Bierstaker and Wright 2001).  Such competing goals of employees cause them to 
experience anxiety and stress (Bagley 2010). 
Environmental uncertainty also creates pressure when individuals perceive that 
they do not have sufficient information, or when they fail to understand or cannot predict 
factors in the work environment.  More importantly, individuals feel stressed because 
they cannot understand or foresee the possible outcomes associated with their 
performance or cannot adequately assess how environmental factors affect their 
performance (Ducan 1972).  Environmental uncertainty is an important contextual factor 
of incentive contracting.  In the incentive contracting literature, Holmstrom (1979) 
developed the informativeness principle, which states that any measure of performance 
that is informative of agents’ effort level should be included in the compensation 
contract.  Based on this principle, environment indicators should be written into 
contracts, even though these measures do not directly measure agents’ effort.  Such 
incentive contracts may create stress as individuals perceive that they lack control over 
their performance indicators and economic welfare. 
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The third category of factors that contribute to stress in the workplace refers to 
“career development.”  This category focuses on promotion, job security and career 
development opportunities.  The economics literature documents that to be promoted is 
an important motive of employees (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Malcomson 1984; Rosen 
1986; Prendergast 1993, 1999; Waldman 2003).  Promotion is also viewed as a 
tournament incentive scheme with winners being promoted (Lazear and Rosen 1981).  
Therefore, the competition involved in promotion may be stressful.  In addition, an 
employee’s job security and career development is heavily influenced by employees’ 
learning and skill development throughout an employee’s job tenure.  Such activities are 
challenging and difficult and may impose stress.  For example, to learn a new technology 
may be difficult for senior employees.  The decision to engage in such activities is an 
integral part of the effort allocation decision, which concerns the tradeoff between short- 
and long-term benefit of employees as well as the firm.  Such decisions are influenced 
and facilitated by the incentive contracting practice. When the incentive contracts 
incentivize people to engage in learning and skill development, it potentially poses 
challenge and creates stress for some employees.  
The fourth category pertains to the interpersonal relationships within the 
workplace.  Employees need to manage their relationships with supervisors, coworkers 
and subordinates. The amount/nature of interaction is dictated by the design of jobs and 
control systems. For example, the design of the job determines the number of employees 
within a work team and the amount of interactions among team members.  As another 
example, incentive schemes determine whether employees are required to compete or 
collaborate with each other.  For supervisor-subordinate interaction, the design of the 
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control system dictates the amount of discretion supervisors have over subordinate 
compensation.  
 The fifth category refers to the organizational structure and climate.  This 
category pertains to the communication pattern, management style and employees’ 
participation in decisions.  From a management accounting perspective, this category 
involves formal information systems and policies.  It is also related to the specific 
practice of participative budgeting and employee self-evaluation, both of which offer 
opportunities for employees to have a voice in setting goals and performance evaluation 
(e.g., Blakely 1993; Elicker et al. 2006; Nathan et al. 1991). 
In terms of the consequences of stress and pressure, in the accounting literature, to 
date the majority of stress research has focused on public accounting settings (see 
DeZoort and Lord 1997 for a review).  Outcomes documented in this literature include 
both behavioral outcomes and attitudinal consequences.  Examples of behavioral 
outcomes are absenteeism, turnover and effectiveness and efficiency of audit 
performance.  Examples of attitudinal consequences include intrinsic and extrinsic job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, professional commitment motivation and 
turnover intentions.  The outcome of stress has not been documented in terms of the 
cooperation decision (i.e., deciding whether to behave cooperatively).   
2.3 Stress Coping Behaviors in Collaborative Context   
Prior research on stress and emotion suggest that stressful situations triggers 
anxiety (Lazarus 1993).  As discussed in the previous section, stress arises as individuals 
assess the relationship between themselves and their environment (Lazarus and Folkman 
1986).  In this relationship, individuals’ thoughts of assessment, or cognitive appraisals, 
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play a key role in the emotional experiences and stress coping behaviors.  The primary 
cognitive appraisal of stressful situation is the anticipation of potential harm and threat.  
In the workplace, successfully completing tasks and achieving high performance are 
important goals for employees.  The possible failure to achieve goals constitutes harm 
and threat, because such failure can have significant effects on employees’ economic 
welfare, social-appraisal and/or self-appraisal (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; Tesser and 
Campbell 1980).  As a result, stressful situations cause people to experience anxiety.  
Anxiety is an emotion that consists of an affective component and a cognitive-appraisal 
component.  The affective component is a combination of displeasure and high activation 
(Russell 2003).  The cognitive appraisal component is worrying, which is caused by a 
threat (e.g., Raghunathan and Pham 1999; Maner et al. 2006).   
Anxiety causes individuals to develop and engage in compensating strategy.  
People who are anxious worry about the threat to a current goal (i.e., the source of 
anxiety) and employ compensating strategies to reduce anxiety to achieve the goal 
(Eysenck 1992; Eysenck et al. 2007).  According to the theory of affect-as-information 
(Forgas 1995), anxiety triggers the use of compensating strategies, even when a task is 
incidental to the source of anxiety.  Specifically, anxiety motivates an implicit goal of 
threat reduction.  Such motivation operates through feeling monitoring, in which 
individuals evaluate available options by asking themselves which of the options would 
make them feel better (Raghunathan and Pham 1999).  To my knowledge, no study has 
directly examined the effect of stress on cooperation.  However, evidence in the related 
literature suggests that the compensating strategy may be either to cooperate or not to 
cooperate.  I discuss theories pertaining to these two perspectives below. 
 26 
2.3.1 Fight-or-Flight 
Threat avoidance has been the dominant strategy of stress coping in the literature.  
The strategy of fight-or-flight suggests that in response to threat, humans (and animals) 
may either confront a stressor aggressively or flee (Cannon 1932).  Such strategy is 
supported from physiological, cognitive and behavioral perspectives.  First, from the 
physiological perspective, studies have documented that under stress a series of 
physiological responses increases individuals’ vigilance and prepares the body to better 
escape from dangerous situations.  Physiological responses to stress, such as degrading of 
glycogen to glucose and increasing cardiovascular activity prepares the body to respond 
to threats of all kinds, including dangerous conditions such as fire, attacks by predators or 
assaults by members of the same species  (Bartlett 1998; Mizock 1995).  The specific 
biological mechanism is the “sympathetic nervous system activation that innervates the 
adrenal medulla, producing a hormonal cascade that results in the secretion of 
catecholamine, especially norepinephrine and epinephrine into the bloodstream (Taylor et 
al. 2000, 411).” 
Second, from a cognitive perspective, studies have shown that anxiety increases 
attention to threat-related stimuli (e.g., Eysenck et al. 1987; Pishyar et al. 2004).  One the 
one hand, anxious individuals exhibit a reduction in detection time of threat-related 
stimuli (for a review, see Fox and Georgiou 2005).  For example, Byrne and Eysenck 
(1995) required participants to detect angry faces among neutral crowds. The speed of 
detection is faster for the high-anxious group than that of the low-anxious group.  On the 
other hand, anxious individuals also display slower disengagement from threat-related 
stimuli.  Such effect is investigated using the dot-prob task, in which participants respond 
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when a dot is detected.  Experimental evidence suggests that although anxious 
participants’ detection response is faster to a dot if the dot is replaced with a threat-
related stimulus than non-anxious participants, anxious participants’ detection response is 
slower to a dot if the dot is replaced with a neutral stimulus. Such effect is driven by the 
difficulty anxious individuals have in disengaging from threat-related stimuli (e.g., 
Eysenck et al. 1987, Pishyar et al. 2004).  
Third, also following a cognitive perspective, studies investigate the risk appraisal 
tendency of anxious individuals.  These studies have shown that anxiety influences the 
assessment of ambiguous situations, such as perception of the severity and likelihood of 
negative outcomes.  Such assessment, in turn, enhances individuals’ risk-avoidant 
orientation.  For example, in the clinical psychology literature, it is documented that 
social anxiety disorder and phobic avoidance individuals exhibit negative expectancies 
(e.g., Barlow 2002; Butler and Mathews 1983; Sloan and Telch 2002; Telch et al. 1989).  
They tend to overestimate the likelihood and the intensity of distress involved in social 
events (Foa et al. 1996; Lucock and Salkovskis 1988).  Similarly, generalized anxiety 
disorder individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood and intensity of distress 
associated with negative experiences in general (Butler and Mathews 1987).  In a non-
clinical sample of university students, Maner and Schmidt (2006) provide evidence that 
trait anxiety is associated with pessimistic risk appraisals (i.e., heightened perceptions of 
the likelihood and the severity of negatives outcomes) and an exaggerated tendency to 
engage in risk-avoidant decision making. 
Fourth, consistent with risk-averse orientation under stress, behavioral research 
documents that stress and anxiety increase risk-avoidant behavior in decisions (e.g., Clark 
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et al., 2012; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999).  With respect to decisions with hypothetical 
payoffs, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) show that participants in anxious moods tend to 
prefer the low risk-low payoff gamble compared to neutral mood participants.  They also 
show that participants in anxious moods favor the low salary-high security job compared 
to neutral mood participants. Similarly, Clark et al (2012) document that the threat of 
electric shock produced increased electrodermal activity and a sustained decrease in heart 
rate, consistent with defensive vigilance. Such threat also exerts immediate effects on 
decision making, biasing participants towards safer alternatives.  
In sum, the fight-and-flight strategy is supported by various studies using different 
approaches.  These studies document that stress enhances vigilance and increases 
attention to threat-related factors.  In addition, stressed individuals make negative risk 
assessments and exhibit risk-avoidant behaviors.  Such tendencies potentially affect 
individuals’ willingness to cooperate, because the collaborative context involves 
relational risk, which is the possibility of being exploited by a partner.  Although based 
on the game theory the relation risk is 100% and should not be considered in decisions, as 
discussed in the literature review section, individuals do not always shirk. More 
importantly, they do not believe that others always shirk.  The relational risk constitute a 
threat to individual’s welfare: the individuals’ welfare is higher when the cooperation 
partner choose to exert effort than when the cooperation partner choose not to exert 
effort.  According to the above reviewed evidence on the fight-and-flight strategy, in a 
collaborative context, stressed individuals may be more vigilant to relational risk than 
non-stressed individuals.  As a result, they are more willing to attend such information 
and act accordingly.  That is to say, stressed individuals are less likely to cooperate as 
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they worry about being exploited.  In addition, stressed individuals may form negative 
expectations about the behavior of a cooperation partner.  As a result, stress may obstruct 
cooperation. 
2.3.2 Tend-and-Befriend 
Fight-or-flight does not provide a complete picture of humans’ stress coping.  
Humans also respond to stress by forming affiliations.  This strategy, termed “tend-and-
befriend,” suggests that individuals provide and receive joint protection by forming 
groups in threatening times (Baumeister and Leary 1995).  The psychology research has a 
long history of investigating the need to belong. Early conceptualizations date back to the 
1930s, when Freud (1930) asserted that humans had a need for interpersonal contact.  As 
another example, Maslaw (1968) ranked “love and belongingness needs” as one of his 
motivational hierarchy.  According to Maslaw, the need to belong emerge after basic 
needs such as hunger and safety, but before advanced needs such as esteem and self-
actualization.  Consistent with these early conceptualizations, many other studies have 
also made suggestions that belongness is one of the basic needs of human (e.g., Epstein 
1992; Ryan 1991).  Baumeister and Leary (1995) formally proposed and evaluated such 
need by synthesizing empirical evidence.  This study concludes that the need to belong is 
the need for frequent, nonaversive interactions within an ongoing relational bond.  People 
seek to form social attachment, and meanwhile, resist the dissolution of existing bonds.  
Lack of attachment is associated with negative consequences in terms of health, 
adjustment and well-being.   
Recent studies provide a biological account of this effect (Taylor 2006; Taylor et 
al. 2000).  This research suggests the existence of an affiliative neurocircuitry that 
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prompts affiliation in response to stress.  People have a need to maintain an adequate 
level of protective and rewarding social relationships, just as people have basic needs, 
like hunger, thirst, sexual drives and other appetites.  The neurocircuitry system regulates 
social-approach behavior in the same way as systems that regulate behaviors to satisfy 
other appetitive needs.  Oxytocin is released in response to (at least some) stressors.  It 
prompts affiliative behavior in response to stress, in conjunction with dopaminergic and 
opioid systems.  The level of oxytocin is reduced (heightened) if social contacts are 
supportive and comforting (unsupportive and hostile) (Taylor 2006). Similarly, in clinical 
psychology, research provides evidence that availability of social support before 
exposure to acute social stress is associated with attenuated cortisol and cardiovascular 
activity, indicating that social support may play a role in preventing and reducing stress 
(e.g., Christenfeld et al. 1997; Baumgartner et al. 2003).  
To my knowledge, the only studies that investigate the effect of stress on socio-
economic decision is von Dawans et al. (2012), which suggest that stressed people 
engage in social-approach behavior because attachments to social groups operate as a 
stress buffering strategy.  This study operationalized stress using the standard laboratory 
stressor, in which the stressed group completes 12 minutes of a public speaking task and 
8 minutes of a mental-arithmetic task.  By contrast, the control group completes 12 
minutes of simultaneous group reading in a low voice and 8 minutes of an easy counting 
task (von Dawans et al. 2012).  This study provides evidence that participants who 
experienced a socio-evaluative threat exhibit more pro-social behavior in a trust game 
and in a binary dictator game than participants who did not experience a socio-evaluative 
threat.  A potential implication is that stress can facilitate cooperation. 
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Although the theories of fight-or-flight and tend-and-befriend offer conflicting 
predictions about the effect of stress on cooperative behaviors, both theories have solid 
evolutionary and psychological bases and potentially apply to collaborative settings.  I 




 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 Ego and External Stressors 
As is discussed in the previous section, prior studies classify stressors into five 
categories including (1) factors unique to the job, (2) role in the organization, (3) career 
development, (4) interpersonal work relationships and (5) organizational 
structure/climate.  While this classification scheme is very descriptive of potential 
sources of stress, it is not informative as to the behavioral effects of stressors. To shed 
light on the effects of stressors on cooperation, I propose an alternative classification 
scheme in this paper.  
Stressful situations may differ in the responsibility of possible failure.  Based on 
cognitive appraisal theory, responsibility is one of the basic dimensions that people 
constantly assess (consciously or unconsciously): for a given situation, one may perceive 
that the self is responsible or that someone or something else is responsible (Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985).  As is discussed, stress arises when individuals sense the possibility of 
failure to achieve personal goals based on their assessment of the relation between 
themselves and the environment, especially when they perceive that their resource level 
is relatively low while the demand level in the environment is relatively high (Lazarus 
and Folkman 1986).  Depending on the relative salience of the two aspects, stress differs 
in the secondary cognitive appraisal of responsibility: one may perceive that the self is 
responsible or that threat-related factors in the environment are responsible.  
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Based on the differences in responsibility, I classify stressors into two types, ego 
and external stressors.  First, I define ego stressors as factors that cause individuals to 
worry about their own capabilities and pose a threat to goal achievement.  That is, under 
ego stressors, the possibility of failure to achieve goals is attributed to individuals’ 
inabilities to meet task demands.  Examples of ego stressors include skill or knowledge 
deficiencies, performance feedback and time pressure.  In my definition, I use the word 
“ego,” which means self or self-esteem (Merriam-Webster 2013), to highlight two 
important aspects of this type of stress.  First, stressors are defined based on different 
attributions of possible failure rather than the origin of stressors.  Specifically, ego stress 
causes individuals to question their own capabilities and influences their self-concept 
negatively.  Importantly, ego stressors may originate within (e.g., skill deficiency) or 
outside (e.g., performance feedback) an individual.  Second, for this type of stress, one 
perceives either consciously or unconsciously that oneself rather than other people or 
environmental factors is responsible for the outcomes.  Under this type of stress, people 
feel compelled to maneuver their available resources to achieve their goals.  Third, the 
type of stress is determined by the responsibility perception, which is formed at the 
stressed moment rather than any other moment.  That is to say, perception of 
responsibility may change throughout the task.  Such perception is especially likely to 
change after the task depending on whether a person succeeded due to the self-serving 
attribution.  These ex post attribution does not determine the type of a stressor.    
Many factors in the workplace, particularly “factors unique to jobs,” fall within 
this category.  Because jobs are designed for employees to perform, employees often 
have a strong influence over job-related outcomes.  During a task, employees focus on 
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the amount and the intensity of effort to exert.  They also choose among available 
strategies to perform the task.  For example, work load, time pressure, incentive contracts 
and performance feedback and influence employees effort and performance.  These 
factors also influences individual perceptions regarding whether they are capable of 
fulfilling task demand, as a result, create ego stress.  Similarly, in the category of “career 
development,” factors such as learning a new technology can be very challenging for 
some people.  Therefore, they are likely to be ego stressors most of the time.  
I define external stressors as factors in the environment that pose a threat to goal 
achievement.  That is, under external stress, threat-related environmental factors are 
responsible for possible failure.  External stressors has the following characteristics.  
First, external stressors originate outside an individual.  They are uncertain or 
uncontrollable factors in a business environment or within an organization.  Second, with 
this kind of stress, individuals perceive that they cannot exert influence over the outcome 
or situation.  Either someone else is controlling the situation or no one can influence the 
situation.  That is to say, the outcome of the situation may be undesirable even if 
individuals exert effort to their full capacity.  Third, similar to ego stress, the 
responsibility, which is perceived at the stressed moment, determines the type of stress.  
Such perception may change over time.  
Many factors of “roles in the organization” are external stressors.  I explain role 
ambiguity, role conflict and uncertainty with examples.  Regarding role ambiguity and 
role conflict, employees become stressed when they face difficulties making effort-
related choices or making decisions due to the difficulty of identifying an optimal 
strategy.  For example, when employees are compensated along multiple job dimensions 
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that are conflicting, they may perceive that it is impossible to identify an optimal strategy, 
even though an optimal strategy exists.  As another example, when employees are 
compensated based on environment indicators, employees may perceive that they have no 
influence over these indicators, even though such indicators are informative of effort 
level and, therefore, increase the efficiency of the compensation contract.  As a result, 
they feel uncertain about their welfare. Regarding the perceived environmental 
uncertainty, employees are stressed because they cannot predict factors in their 
environment, or they do not understand the impact of these factors on performance.  For 
example, the risk that comes from market forces, such as competition and demand 
fluctuation, may prevent an employee from meeting a performance target.  As another 
example, information about an upcoming organizational restructuring poses a threat to 
employees’ job security and future economic well-being.  In these cases, employees 
perceive that uncontrollable factors, instead of themselves, are responsible for the 
possible failure to achieve their goals. 
Factors of “interpersonal relationships” also are likely to be external stressors.  
Stressors such as harassment, discrimination, biased opinions, hearsay, and other 
derogatory remarks are initiated by other people.  Although employees may have some 
influence over these stressors by changing their own behavior or by reporting others’ bad 
behavior, employees cannot take control over these adverse situations in the short term.  
As a result, they feel distressed and hostile toward others. 
3.2 Stress Coping Behaviors under Two Stressors 
As discussed earlier, I expect all stressors to induce the primary cognitive 
appraisal of perceived threat, which activates the emotion of anxiety and triggers coping 
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behavior.  In this section, I argue that due to the secondary cognitive appraisal of 
responsibility, stressors trigger additional subsets of emotions in addition to anxiety.  As 
a result, different types of stressors lead to different choices of coping options.  See 
Figure 1 for the theoretical framework. 









In the presence of an ego stressor, one attributes the possibility of failure to 
oneself.  In other words, individuals worry that their own capabilities are not sufficient to 
satisfy task demands.  Such situations of inadequacy reduce individuals’ self-confidence 
and self-esteem.  As a result, individuals experience a reduction in strength and pride 
(Hewitt 2009).  I expect this kind of cognitive appraisal to prime the motivational 
tendency of protection-seeking, and as a result, an individual will act more cooperatively.  
From the perspective of motivational tendency, because ego stress causes a feeling of 
inadequate competence, it primes an individual to seek help and joint-protection.  
Because help and protection can be obtained via affiliations (Baumeister and Leary 
1995), the presence of ego stress is expected to increase affiliative behavior, promoting 
cooperation.  
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Prior studies provide evidence consistent with the prediction that ego stress 
increases cooperation.  As discussed earlier, in response to some stressors, the biological 
mechanism of affiliative neurocircuitry prompts affiliative behavior (Taylor 2006; Taylor 
et al. 2000).  Other evidence has shown that ego stress facilitates affiliative behaviors in a 
lab experiment (von Dawans et al. 2012).  Specifically, the presence of ego stressors 
induced by public speaking and mental math calculations increase trusting and sharing 
behaviors in trust games and dictator games, respectively.  Therefore, I expect that people 
are more willing to cooperate when the level of ego stress is high than when it is low.5 
H1:  Individuals are more likely to cooperate when the level of ego stress is high 
than when it is low. 
In contrast, in the presence of external stressors, the possibility of failure in 
completing a task is attributed to threat related factors in the environment.  For external 
stress, individuals perceive that factors in the environment may hinder their goal 
achievement.  In such situations, individuals experience antagonism and enmity toward 
someone or something that is causing this situation. As a result, individuals may feel 
hostile and angry (Yik et al. 2011).  I expect that this kind of cognitive appraisal will 
prime the motivational tendency of threat-avoidance, causing an individual to act less 
cooperatively.  From the perspective of motivational tendency, because external stress 
induces a feeling of hostility and enmity, it motivates an individual to avoid threat and 
                                                 
 
 
5The prediction that ego stressors increase cooperation is not due to the increase in risk taking. In fact, 
studies show that ego stressors decrease or do not change risk taking in individual economic decisions. For 
example, Yip and Cote (2013) show that anxiety induced by public speaking reduces risk-seeking in 
choosing gambles. As another example, socio-evaluative threats induced by public speaking and mental 
math problems do not influence risk preferences in choosing gambles (von Dawans et al., 2012).  
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risk that are present in the environment.  As a result, external stress reduces an 
individual’s willingness to bear relational risk.   
The prediction that external stress decreases cooperation, consistent with the 
“fight-or flight” strategy, is supported by extant findings.  Studies have shown that 
various external stressors lead to risk-aversive behavior. For example, Clark et al. (2012) 
operationalizes stress as an intermittent delivery of mild electric shock.  This study 
suggests that individuals under stress make more risk-avoidant choices in a gambling task 
than those who are not under stress.  As another example, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) 
operationalize anxiety by requiring participants to imagine a scenario in which the person 
might have cancer, but the experimenter does not reveal the outcome of the doctor’s visit.  
This study suggests that individuals under stress make more risk-averse choices in 
gambles and in job selection.  While these prior studies focus on individual economic 
decisions, I am not aware of any studies that examine the effect of external risk in the 
context of relational risk.   
The relational risk is fundamentally different from the economic risk for the 
following reasons. First, the economic risk involves the objective probability of each 
perspective outcome. By contrast, relational risk involves the perceived probability of 
other people’s behavior.  Second, in studies that investigate economic risk-taking 
behaviors, the expected value is held constant across all options. In such cases, 
individuals face the choice between relatively safe and relatively risky options. By 
contrast, when individuals make decisions involving relational risks, their outcome 
realizations are always contingent upon others’ behavior.  That is to say, choosing not to 
cooperate is not “safer” than choosing to cooperate.  However, I argue that individuals’ 
 39 
mental representation of the cooperation decision may lead them to perceive that 
choosing to cooperate exposes themselves to the threat of relational risk. Specifically, 
when individuals choose to cooperate, they perceive that they are being exploited if their 
partners choose not to cooperate. By contrast when individuals choose not to cooperate, 
they do not perceive that they are being taken advantage of if their partners choose not to 
cooperate. As a result, individuals perceive that choosing to cooperate exposes 
themselves to the threat of being exploited, choosing not to cooperate avoid such 
possibilities. Therefore, because external stress causes individuals to avoid threat, 
individuals are less likely to cooperate when they are under high level of external stress 
than when they are under low level of external stress. 
H2:  Individuals are less likely to cooperate when the level of external stress is 







Given my hypotheses that different types of stressors can have distinct effects on 
emotional responses and decision making, it is important to ensure that my manipulation 
induces these emotional states effectively.  My manipulation was designed after that used 
by Milkman et al. (2012), which involved participants writing about stressful scenarios 
and their feelings in these scenarios.  In this section, I first explain the advantage of such 
manipulation.  I then discuss pretest results which assess the effectiveness of my 
manipulation. 
4.1 Advantage of Directed-writing Task 
I choose to induce stress and anxiety incidentally, instead of integrally.  Incidental 
emotion means that the source of the emotion is not related to the decision task; integral 
emotion means that the source of the emotion is part of the decision task (Lerner et al. 
2007).  From the methodological perspective, incidental manipulation is better in terms of 
testing the causal relationship between stress and behavioral consequences.  The issue of 
manipulating stress integrally is that these manipulations results in confounds in 
determining the effect of stress on behavior.  Below, I illustrate such confounding effects 
with the example of the effect of time pressure on cooperation.  Based on my theory of 
stress coping behaviors, the hypothesized relationship is that time pressure causes 
individuals to experience ego stress and, therefore, behave more cooperatively.  If I use 
an integral manipulation, that is, if I use one single task to impose time limitation and to 
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elicit effort level, the manipulation of time limitation itself reduces the amount of time 
available to perform the task and influences the duration and the intensity of effort.  In 
addition, the manipulation of time limitation reduces the amount of time available to 
make thoughtful evaluations of available options. Individuals may change their effort 
level simply because they do not have enough time to understand the incentive structure 
of the cooperation issue.  As a result of such confounding arguments, one cannot tell 
whether and how stress plays a role in the presence of time pressure. 
I choose the directed-writing task to induce the perceived stress, instead of 
manipulating the stressors directly in the lab for the following reasons.  First, the 
directed-writing task is likely to induce emotion successfully.  People experience various 
emotions on a daily basis.  The directed-writing task allows researchers to simulate such 
emotions in the laboratory.  This technique was first developed by Strack et al. (1985), 
and it has been used in numerous studies to induce various emotions (e.g., Dunn and 
Schweitzer 2005; Fessler et al.  2004; Lerner and Keltner 2000).  Second, the directed-
writing task is not influenced by any task-specific skill or task-specific confidence of a 
participant.  By manipulating a stressor in a direct way, the experimenter needs to employ 
a specific task such as the mental math calculation task.  Participants’ skill level and 
confidence level is expected to influence the perceived stress. Specifically, participants 
are less likely to feel stressed if they perceive their skill is strong.  As a result, such 
manipulation of stress is unlikely to be effective for all participants.  Third, the directed-
writing task is not influenced by personality characteristics.  The affective state of stress 
is likely to be influenced by the personality characteristic of trait anxiety.  Specifically, 
trait anxiety is a level of anxiety that an individual generally feels (Spielberger et al. 
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1983).  When exposed to a situation stimuli, high-trait anxiety individuals are more likely 
to experience state anxiety than low-trait anxiety individuals.  Fourth, the cognitive effort 
required to complete tasks in different conditions is constant.  Potentially, stressors such 
as task difficulty cause a difference in cognitive processing and induce different levels of 
depletion of cognitive resources.  As a result, such stressors influence subsequent 
decision processes.6  Fifth, this manipulation is independent of individuals’ economic 
incentives.  Sixth, this manipulation does not introduce confounding factors or 
mechanisms involved in stressors, such as performance feedback and time pressure.7  
4.2 Ego Stressors 
In this study, I operationalize different levels of ego stress by inducing different 
levels of perceived skill deficiency. Participants in the study complete a directed-writing 
task, with those in the high ego stress condition (HIGHEGO) writing about the 
weaknesses that they are most worried about, and those in the low ego stress condition 
(LOWEGO) writing about the strengths that they are most content about.  In four 
sequential questions, participants first briefly describe their weaknesses (strengths) in 
terms of skill that they are most worried (content) about.  Then, they describe one 
situation that their weaknesses (strengths) in skill may bring negative (positive) 
consequences in the future.  Participants are asked to describe it such that a person 
                                                 
 
 
6 Performing cognitively challenging tasks depletes self-regulatory resources and impairs performance in 
subsequent tasks if these tasks require the executive function, such as inhibition, shifting, and working 
memory updating (Hagger et al. 2010). 
7 For example, feedback valence might influence individuals’ willingness to cooperate. As another 
example, time pressure might increase the use of an intuitive decision mode (as opposed to deliberative 
decision mode) and increase cooperation (Rand et al. 2012).  
 43 
reading the description would understand their situation and feel worried/content just 
from reading about it.  In the last two questions, participants describe their emotional and 
physical reactions when they thought about their weaknesses (strengths).  This 
manipulation is adapted directly from Milkman (2012).   
In the pretest, I measure participants’ emotions following the directed-writing 
task. Participants answered questions concerning how they felt using a four-point scale, 
with one anchoring on “not at all,” and four anchoring on “very much.”  Measures of 
emotions include a total of twenty items. Among these twenty items, six are measures of 
anxiety from Marteau and Bekker (1992), including calm (reverse-coded), upset, tense, 
relaxed (reverse-coded), content (reverse-coded) and worried.  According to Marteau and 
Bekker (1992), the state anxiety index, anxiety, is computed as the sum of all six items.  
In addition, measures include fourteen items of other emotions from Watson et al. (1988).  
These 14 items are interested, enthusiastic, scared, attentive, determined, inspired, alert, 
alert, active, strong, proud, ashamed, guilty, irritable and hostile.   
Forty participants recruited from Mturk participated in the pretest. Twenty-one 
participants were randomly assigned to the HIGHEGO condition and 19 to the LOWEGO 
conditions.  Average anxiety was 14.81 in the HIGHEGO condition and 9.47 in the 
LOWEGO condition.  The difference in anxiety was statistically significant with a p-
value less than 0.001 (two-tailed).  This result shows that requiring participants to write 
about a high ego stress situation induces a higher level of anxiety than requiring them to 
write about a low ego stress situation.   
Ego stress also influences other emotions.  I next discuss these emotions as they 
are informative of individuals’ thoughts, which shed light on cognitive appraisals and 
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tendencies.  First, high level of ego stress leads to a lower level of pride (p < 0.01, two-
tailed) and strength (p < 0.01, two-tailed) than low level of ego stress. Such evidence is 
also consistent with the concept of ego stress.  As individuals perceive that their 
capabilities are inadequate, they perceive a low level of personal strength and pride.  
Further, high level of ego stress leads to lower responses to enthusiasm (p = 0.02, two-
tailed), interest (p = 0.01, two-tailed) and inspire (p <0.01, two-tailed) than low level of 
ego stress. Panel A of Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviation of self-reported 
emotion for the two conditions. This table also reports the p-value of the pairwise 
comparisons of emotions between the two conditions. 
Table 1: Self-reported Emotion in Pretest 
 











Anxiety Index 14.81 [4.61] 9.47 [2.64] <0.001 
Calm 2.29 [0.96] 3.05  [0.62] <0.001 
Tense 2.43 [0.93] 1.26 [0.56] <0.001 
Upset 1.76 [0.89] 1.21 [0.71] 0.019 
Relaxed 2.38 [0.92] 3.05 [0.71] <0.001 
Content 1.95 [0.97] 3.05 [0.52] <0.001 
Worried 2.24 [0.94] 1.16 [0.37] <0.001 
Interested 2.62 [0.86] 3.26 [0.73] 0.016 
Enthusiastic 1.86 [0.96] 2.63 [0.90] 0.012 
Scared 1.90 [0.77] 1.21 [0.54] 0.002 
Attentive 3.10 [0.70] 3.11 [0.88] 0.968 
Determined 2.76 [1.00] 3.00 [0.58] 0.367 
Inspired 1.90 [0.94] 3.11 [0.66] <0.001 
Alert 3.33 [0.66] 2.89 [0.81] 0.067 
Active 2.43 [0.93] 2.79 [0.85] 0.210 
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Strong 2.24 [0.94] 2.95 [0.62] 0.009 
Proud 2.00 [0.95] 3.05 [0.71] <0.001 
Ashamed 1.67 [0.91] 1.11 [0.32] 0.015 
Guilty 1.52 [0.81] 1.21 [0.71] 0.205 
Irritable 1.67 [1.02] 1.21 [0.54] 0.089 
Hostile 1.38 [0.86] 1.05 [0.23] 0.117 
 













Anxiety Index 14.74 [4.64] 9.59 [2.11] <0.001 
Calm 2.32 [1.00] 3.09 [0.53] 0.003 
Tense 2.26 [0.87] 1.32 [0.57] <0.001 
Upset 1.89 [0.81] 1.05 [0.21] <0.001 
Relaxed 2.21 [0.98] 3.05 [0.72] 0.003 
Content 2.26 [0.99] 2.86 [0.71] 0.030 
Worried 2.37 [0.83] 1.23 [0.43] <0.001 
Interested 2.68 [0.89] 2.77 [0.69] 0.720 
Enthusiastic 2.11 [0.99] 2.23 [0.92] 0.686 
Scared 1.89 [0.94] 1.05 [0.21] <0.001 
Attentive 3.26 [0.81] 3.09 [0.53] 0.417 
Determined 2.68 [1.11] 2.59 [1.01] 0.779 
Inspired 2.16 [1.17] 2.41 [0.85] 0.432 
Alert 3.00 [0.94] 3.00 [0.82] 1.000 
Active 2.47 [0.84] 2.32 [0.99] 0.595 
Strong 2.11 [0.88] 2.27 [0.98] 0.571 
Proud 2.05 [1.03] 2.27 [1.03] 0.499 
Ashamed 1.58 [0.96] 1.05 [0.21] 0.015 
Guilty 1.58 [1.07] 1.09 [0.29] 0.074 
Irritable 1.89 [0.94] 1.09 [0.29] <0.001 




Cell mean reports participants’ responses to questions of how were they feeling for each of the 20 items on 
a four point scale. 1 = not at all and 4 = very much.  
Anxiety index is the sum of six items, calm (reverse-coded), upset, tense, relaxed (reverse-coded), content 
(reverse-coded) and worried.  
 
 
High level of ego stress also leads to a higher responses to scare (p < 0.01, two-
tailed) and shame (p = 0.02, two-tailed) than low level of ego stress. The emotion that 
arising from being scared is related to the fear of negative outcomes. Such emotion is in 
line with the concept of threat, which involves the possible failure of goal achievement. 
The emotion of shame has a few cognitive characteristics, including lack of control, 
being inferior to others and feeling observed by others (Tangney 1993). All of these 
characteristics are consistent with the appraisal of high ego stress situations. Under ego 
stress, personal weaknesses cause people to perceive that they cannot control the 
situation. Moreover, ego stress arises due to a threat to one’s self-image of being 
competent. In addition, the writing task, which forces people to expose their weakness to 
the experimenter, may cause people to feel that they are being observed by others and 
heighten the feelings of shame. 
4.3 External Stressors 
I operationalize external stress by manipulating perceived uncertainty.   The 
procedure is the same as that used in Milkman (2012).  Participants in the study 
completed a directed-writing task, with those in the high external stress 
(HIGHEXTERNAL) condition writing about things that they are most uncertain about in 
their life and those in the low external stress (LOWEXTERNAL) condition writing about 
things that they are most certain about.  Then, they describe the one situation that has 
made them the most uncertain they have been in their life (the last time they sat in a quiet 
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place).  Participants are asked to describe it such that a person reading the description 
would become uncertain (feel that they have been there just from reading about it).  In the 
last two questions, participants describe their emotions and physical reactions when they 
feel uncertain (sat in a quiet place).   
Forty participants were recruited from MTurk to participate in the pretest; 19 
participants were randomly assigned to the HIGHEXTERNAL condition and 21 to the 
LOWEXTERNAL condition.  Similar to the pretest of the ego stress, participants 
complete the same 20-item emotion instrument following the directed-writing task.  
Average anxiety was 14.73 in the HIGHEXTERNAL condition and 9.52 in the 
LOWEXTERNAL condition.  The difference of anxiety was statistically significant, and 
the p-value was less than 0.01 (two-tailed).   
External stress also induces other emotions.  Different from ego stress, high 
external stress increases the emotions of hostility (p=0.01, two-tailed) and irritability 
(p<0.01, two-tailed) compared to low external stress.  Such evidence sheds light on the 
emotional structure of different types of stress.  My theory is that both types of stress 
induce negative affective states of anxiety, which drive people’s behavior to reduce such 
negative states.  More importantly, two types of stress engender additional thoughts and 
tendencies, which dictate the specific type of stress coping behavior.  The hostile and 
irritable feeling induced by high level of external stress implies the thought of 
unfriendliness, enmity and opposition.  The presence of thoughts are consistent with the 
argument that high level of external stress causes people to feel that factors in their 
environment are unfavorable and may cause them to fail to achieve their goals.  As a 
result, people are expected to be less willing to be exposed to threat related factors.  
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Different from ego stress, self-reported positive emotions are not different between high 
and low levels of external stress.  These results clearly indicate that the two types of 
stress induce different sets of emotions.  The cognitive contents of emotions are 
consistent with the definitions of the different types of stress.  Panel B of Table 1 reports 
the mean and standard deviation of self-reported emotions for the two conditions.  This 
table also reports the p-value of the pairwise comparisons of emotions between two 
conditions. 
Similar to ego stress, external stress increases participants’ negative emotions of 
shame and being scared.  Response to scare are higher for high external stress 
participants compared to low external stress participants, with a p-value smaller than 0.01 
(two-tailed).  The emotion of scare arises as people feel fearful of possible failure.  
Shame also is higher for high external stress participants than low external stress 
participants, with a p-value of 0.015 (two-tailed).  This emotion of shame may be induced 
as people feel that their lack of control and their inferior situation is disadvantageous 




 EXPERIMENT ONE 
 
I conducted an experiment to test hypothesis 1, involving ego stress. In this 
experiment, participants complete two tasks, a directed-writing task and a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game.  Task 1 is the directed-writing task, in which I manipulated the 
independent variable of ego stress in the same way as the pretest.  Task 2 is an 
incentivized decision task: the setup is similar to a Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which 
participants decide whether to contribute to a common project.  The dependent variable is 
the binary decision of whether to contribute.  
5.1 Manipulation 
A directed-writing task is used to manipulate stress as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  In the main experiment, I did not measure emotions after the directed-writing 
task and before the decision task, because lengthy emotion self-reports may reduce the 
influence of emotion on judgment (e.g., Cook and Campbell 1979) and therefore weaken 
the proposed effects.  Several studies have used the same method, in which researchers 
conducts a pretest, which includes the manipulation and the emotion measures, and a 
main experiment, which includes the manipulation and the judgment task (Raganathan 
and Pham 1999; Dunn and Schweitzer 2005; Lerner Keltner 2001). 
5.2 Decision Task 
Immediately after the directed-writing task, participants complete a decision task.  
Before learning the information related to the decision, participants are reminded that 
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they will receive additional payment, the amount of which is determined by their decision 
and that of another randomly selected Mturk participant with whom they are paired.  In 
addition, they are provided with detailed information about the way the additional 
payment is administered.  Next, participants are informed that they will make only one 
decision.  The decision task follows. 
“You and the other Mturk participant will decide separately whether you would 
like to CONTRIBUTE your endowment (20 cents) to a COMMON PROJECT.  If 
BOTH of you decide NOT to contribute, both of you will keep your endowment 
(20 cents).  If BOTH of you decide to contribute, both of you will get 40 cents.  If 
ONLY ONE OF YOU decides to contribute, the one who contributes will get 0 
cents, the one who does NOT contribute will get 70 cents.”  
 Participants make a simple binary choice: “Your decision is to Contribute/Not 
Contribute.”8  For this decision task, I describe the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in the 
context of investing in the common project, instead of using completely abstract language 
such as choosing between options A and B. The purpose of this design choice is to allow 
participants to perceive the common project as a medium of forming affiliations, which is 
a key argument underlying my theory. This design choice has external validity: it is 
consistent with an organizational context, where employees make a decision of whether 
to exert effort toward a group project.     
                                                 
 
 
8 I use an abstract choice task to measure cooperation for two reasons. First, an abstract effort choice is a 
precise measure, because it is not influenced by individuals’ task specific skills. More importantly, prior 
studies suggest that stress and anxiety influence individuals’ cognitive performance and task outcomes 
(e.g., Eysenck 2007; DeZoort and Lord 1999). Therefore, using an abstract task avoids this confounding 
effect.  
 51 
After making their decisions, participants complete a post-experimental 
questionnaire, including questions related to their decision processes, risk attitude, and 
demographic information.  Specifically, questions about decision processes elicits 
participants’ desire to cooperate, estimates of others choices, concerns about their own 
payment, concerns about the partner’s payment, ethical sensitivity, motives to manage 
impression, motives to avoid feeling guilty and team identity. Demographic questions 
requires people to report their gender, age, education and work experience.   
5.3 Participants 
This experiment was conducted using Mturk, which offers immediate access to a 
large participant pool.  Prior findings suggest conducting my study on Mturk is 
appropriate.  First, lab results of Prisoner’s Dilemma games are replicated successfully 
using online participants.  Horton et al. (2011) show that the levels of cooperation are not 
statistically different when the game is played online versus in a physical lab, with the 
payoffs in the physical lab being 10 times the amount in the online experiment.  Second, 
lab results of priming effects are replicated successfully with online participants.  Online 
participants respond to priming effects by altering their choices in ways consistent with 
that of lab participants.  Because an important part of my theory is cognitive priming, I 
expect online participants to provide valid results.  Third, the directed-writing task in my 
experiment is reported to have been used successfully with online participants (Milkman 
2012).  Therefore, it is justifiable to use online participants to test my theories.  
Thirty-eight participants were recruited on MTurk. Table 1 provides a summary 
of demographic information, including gender, age, education, and work experience.  
Nineteen participants are randomly assigned to the HIGHEGO condition and 19 to the 
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LOWEGO condition. There is no statistically significant difference in demographic 
characteristics between the two groups. Participants receive a fixed payment of $0.60 for 
taking part in my experiment.  They receive an additional $0.20 for completing the post-
experiment questionnaire. In addition, they receive, on average, $0.54 representing 
decision-contingent bonuses based on their choices in the decision task and in 
incentivized post-experiment questions (explained in detail in the additional analyses).  
On average, participants spend about 10 minutes on the task.9 
Table 2: Demographic information of experiment one 
 















Panel C: Education 
 
Education Proportion 
High school 13% 
Vocational school 5% 
Some college 32% 
Bachelor's degree 37% 
Master’s degree 13% 
                                                 
 
 
9 Participants received a total compensation of $1.34 for the participation of about 10 minutes. The hourly 
rate is $8.04, which is higher than the average hourly rate on MTurk of $6 per hour. 
 53 
 
Panel D: Work experience 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
11.29 9.50 1 35 
 
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
The dependent variable is the binary choice of whether participants decide to 
contribute to the common project, defined as 1 if a participant contributes and 0 
otherwise.  In the HIGHEGO condition, 13 of 19 (or 68 percent) participants chose to 
cooperate.  In the LOWEGO condition, on the other hand, only 5 of 19 (or 26 percent) 
participants chose to cooperate.  This finding is consistent with my prediction that the 
cooperation rate is higher in the HIGHEGO condition than in the LOWEGO condition.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the mean of cooperation for the two conditions.  
Table 3: Experiment results of experiment one 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
 The HIGHEGO condition 
(N = 19) 
The LOWEGO condition 
(N = 19) 
Mean of cooperation 0.68 0.26 
 
Panel B: Logistic regression analysis (Dependent variable = cooperation) 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z-score p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Stress 1.78 0.72 2.46 P<0.01* [0.36,  3.20] 
Gender 0.14 0.74 0.20 0.85 [-1.30, 1.59] 




Stress = zero for the LOWEGO condition, and one for the HIGHEGO condition. 
Gender = zero for female, and one for male. 
Cooperation = zero if participant choose to contribute, and one otherwise. 
An asterisk indicates a one-tailed p-value for testing a directional prediction. 
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5.5 Test of H1 
           To test H1, I perform a logistic regression with cooperation as the dependent 
variable, the experimental condition of stress as the independent variable, and gender as a 
control variable.  The reason I control for gender in the analysis is because it has been 
shown to influence the choice of a stress coping strategy.  Turton and Campbell (2005) 
show that females are more likely to use a tend-and-befriend strategy than males.  As 
reported in Panel B of Table 3, the result shows that cooperation is statistically significant 
with a p-value smaller than 0.01.  The control variable of gender is not significant at the 
0.10 level.  This result supports H1. 
5.6 Additional Analyses 
My theory behind H1 suggests that ego stress causes individuals to experience the 
emotion of anxiety and increases their desire for cooperation.  To shed light on 
participants’ decision processes, I use a post-experiment question to assess desire for 
cooperation.  Participants rate the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “I have a 
desire to cooperate with the person to whom I was paired with,” on a seven point scale, 
with 1 anchoring on “not at all,” and 7 anchoring on “very much.”  The desire to 
cooperate is 5.26 in the HIGHEGO condition, and 3.95 in the LOWEGO condition.  This 
difference is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.025 (one tailed).  Table 4 presents 
the descriptive statistics of the desire to cooperate for the two conditions. 





Desire to cooperate = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “I have a 
desire to cooperate with the other participant.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very 
much. 
Estimates of others’ choices = participants’ estimates of the percentage of participants who choose to 
cooperate on an 11 point scale, where 1 = 0% and 11 = 100%. Participants could win another 5 
cents if their guess was correct.   
Concerns about one’s own payment = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the 
sentence, “I wanted to maximize my own payment.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 
= very much. 
Concerns about the other’s payment = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the 
sentence, “I wanted to maximize the other participants payment.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not 
at all and 7 = very much. 
Impression management = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “I 
was concerned about what the other participant think of me.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at 
all and 7 = very much. 
Ethical concern = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “It was 
unethical to choose not to contribute.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very much. 
Guilt avoidance = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “I did not 
want to feel guilty about my choices.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very much. 
Team identity = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “I considered 
the other participant to be my teammate.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very 
much. 
Risk Attitude = participants’ choices in a monetary decision task, in which they were offered an extra 20 
cents.  They decided whether to receive the 20 cents directly, or to invest any portion of the 20 
cents in a risky project, which returns 2.5 times the amount invested with 50 percent chance and 0 
cents with 50 percent chance. 1 = investing 0 cents and 11 = investing 20 cents in the risky project. 
An asterisk indicates a one-tailed p value for testing a directional prediction. 
 
In a post experiment question, I elicit participants’ beliefs about other people’s 
behavior by asking them to guess the approximate percentage of participants who choose 
Variable name The HIGHEGO 
condition 










Desire to cooperate 5.26 [0.49] 3.95[0.44] 2.00 0.025* 
Estimates of others’ 
choices 
6.11 [0.47] 5.37 [0.62] 0.94 0.35 
Concerns about one’s 
own payment 
5.42 [0.38] 6.05 [0.25] -1.40 0.17 
Concerns about the 
other’s payment 
4.05 [0.39] 4.26 [0.51] -0.33 0.75 
Impression management 2.26 [0.39] 2.68 [0.47] -0.69 0.50 
Ethical concern 4.00 [0.43] 3.58 [0.50] 0.64 0.53 
Guilt avoidance 3.16 [0.54] 2.42 [0.40] 1.10 0.28 
Team identity 3.74 [0.55] 3.79 [0.49] -0.07 0.94 
Risk Attitude 6.21 [0.65] 5.74 [0.82] 0.45 0.65 
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to cooperate.  Participants could win another 5 cents if their guess was correct.  The 
average estimated cooperation rate was 51.05 percent and 43.68 percent in HIGHEGO 
and LOWEGO conditions, respectively.  Participants’ responses between the two 
conditions were not statistically different (p = 0.18, one-tailed).  However, estimates of 
the probability of the others’ choices clearly influenced participants’ own choices.  
Participants who chose to contribute yielded a higher estimate of cooperation rate (61.67 
percent) compared to those who chose not to cooperate (34.50 percent).  This difference 
was statistically significant with a p-value smaller than 0.001.  Overall, participants 
showed an adequate understanding of the task: those who were more optimistic about the 
cooperation rate were more willing to cooperate.  The mean estimated cooperation rate, 
however, was not affected by stress condition.  Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics 
of the estimates of others’ choices for the two conditions.  
Stress did not influence participants’ estimates of cooperation rates; however, it 
did influence the decision to cooperate.  Such observations are consistent with the theory 
of the motivational effect, which argues that participants are motivated to choose an 
option so they will feel better.  This effect is independent of the perceived relation risk 
between two conditions.  This finding is consistent with some prior studies that have 
examined the effect of emotion on decision-making.  For example, Kugler et al. (2012) 
documents that the emotions of fear and anger affect decisions involving relational risks, 
but do not influence estimates of the probability of others’ choices. 
5.7 Other Randomized Factors 
Various other factors such as personal preferences potentially influence 
cooperation. These are likely to be randomized across the two conditions due to the 
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random assignment of participants.  To ensure that random assignment is successful and 
also to ensure that the manipulation does not change other potential determinants of 
cooperation, I elicit some of these variables in the post experimental questionnaire.  
These variables includes participants’ concerns about their payment, concerns about the 
other’s payment, impression management, ethical consideration, guilt aversion and team 
identity.  None of these variables are statistically significant across different conditions.  
Therefore, they cannot explain the observed differences in cooperation between two 
conditions.  Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of these control variables for the 
two conditions. 
Besides these variables, I also elicit participants’ risk attitudes.  For risk attitude, I 
use the Gneezy and Potters method (Gneezy and Potters 1997).  Specifically, participants 
are offered an extra 20 cents.  They may decide whether to receive the 20 cents directly, 
or to invest any portion of the 20 cents in a risky project, which returns 2.5 times the 
amount invested with 50 percent chance and 0 cents with 50 percent chance.  The results 
show that there is no statistically significant difference between the two conditions.  
Therefore, risk attitude does not account for the observed differences in cooperation. 




 EXPERIMENT TWO 
 
I conduct another experiment to test hypothesis 2, involving external stress, using 
MTurk.  Experiment two is the same as experiment one, with the exception of the stress 
manipulation.  In this experiment, I manipulate external stress in the directed-writing task 
in the same way as the pretest.  I elicit the dependent variable of cooperation as the binary 
decision of whether to contribute in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.  The decision task in 
experiment two is exactly the same as that in experiment one. 
6.1 Participants 
Forty participants are recruited on MTurk.  The demographic information is 
reported in Table 3.  Nineteen participants are randomly assigned to the 
HIGHEXTERNAL condition and 21 to the LOWEXTERNAL condition.  There is no 
statistically significant difference in gender, age, education, or work experience between 
the two conditions.  As in experiment one, participants receive a fixed payment of $0.60 
for participating in the study.  In addition, they receive $0.20 for completing the post-
experiment questionnaire and an average bonus of $0.49 representing decision-contingent 
bonuses.  On average, participants spend 10 minutes on the task.  
Table 5: Demographic information of experiment two 
 
















Panel C: Education 
 
Highest education Proportion 
High school 3% 
Vocational school 43% 
Some college 43% 
Bachelor's degree 13% 
Master’s degree 3% 
 
Panel D: Work experience 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
11.58 8.14 0 32 
 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The dependent variable of the study is the binary choice of whether participants 
decide to contribute to the common project.  I created a variable of cooperation, defined 
as 1 if a participant decides to contribute and 0 otherwise.  In the HIGHEXTERNAL 
condition, 6 of 19 (or 32 percent) participants chose to cooperate.  In the 
LOWEXTERNAL condition, 13 of 21 (or 62 percent) participants chose to cooperate.  
These results are consistent with my expectation that the cooperation rate is lower in the 
HIGHEXTERNAL condition than in the LOWEXTERNAL condition.  Panel A of Table 




Table 6: Results of experiment two 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
 The HIGHEXTERNAL 
condition 
(N = 19) 
The LOWEXTERNAL 
condition 
(N = 21) 
Mean of Cooperation 0.32 0.62 
 
Panel B: Logistic regression analysis (Dependent variable = Cooperation) 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z-score p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
Stress -1.10 0.69 -1.59 0.06* [-2.45, 0.26] 
Gender 1.10 0.71 1.54 0.12 [-0.30, 2.50] 
Intercept -1.10 1.10 1.08 0.28 [-3.27, 1.07] 
 
Notes: 
Stress = zero for the LOWEXTERNAL condition, and one for the HIGHEXTERNAL condition. 
Gender = zero for female, and one for male. 
Cooperation = zero if participant choose to contribute, and one otherwise. 
An asterisk indicates a one-tailed p-value for testing a directional prediction. 
 
6.3 Test of H2 
My second hypothesis predicts that participants are less likely to cooperate when 
the level of external stress is high than when it is low.  To test H2, I conduct a logistic 
regression with cooperation as the dependent variable, experimental condition as the 
between-participant factor and gender as a control variable.  As reported in Panel B of 
Table 6, the result shows that the variable of stress is marginally significant (p =0.06, one 
tailed).  The control variable of gender is not significant at the 0.10 level.  This result 
provides support for H2, though not quite as strong as my findings for H1.  As in 
experiment one, there is no statistical significant differences between two conditions in 
the measure of willingness to cooperate (p=0.23, one tailed), estimated cooperation rate 
(p=0.55, two tailed) and risk attitude (p=0.89, two tailed).  Besides these variables, I also 
elicit various control variables such as concerns for wealth in the same manner as 
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experiment one. None of the control variables are statistically different between two 
conditions.  Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics of these variables for the uncertain 
condition and the certain condition. 




Desire to cooperate = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “I have a 
desire to cooperate with the other participant.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very 
much. 
Estimates of others’ choices = participants’ estimates of the percentage of participants who choose to 
cooperate on an 11 point scale, where 1 = 0% and 11 = 100%. Participants could win another 5 
cents if their guess was correct.   
Concerns about one’s own payment = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the 
sentence, “I wanted to maximize my own payment.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 
= very much. 
Concerns about the other’s payment = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the 
sentence, “I wanted to maximize the other participants payment.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not 
at all and 7 = very much. 
Impression management = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “I 
was concerned about what the other participant think of me.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at 
all and 7 = very much. 
Ethical concern = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “It was 
unethical to choose not to contribute.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very much. 
Guilt avoidance = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “I did not 
want to feel guilty about my choices.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very much. 
Variable name The 
HIGHEXTERNAL 
condition 











Desire to cooperate 5.21 [0.46] 4.71 [0.46] 0.76 0.23* 
Estimates of others’ 
choices 
5.00 [0.37] 4.67 [0.40] 0.60 0.55 
Concerns about one’s 
own payment 
5.90 [0.36] 5.24[0.41] 1.19 0.24 
Concerns about the 
other’s payment 
3.79 [0.48] 4 [0.40] -0.34 0.74 
Impression management 3.00 [0.45] 2.95 [0.45] 0.07 0.94 
Ethical concern 3.68 [0.48] 4.10 [0.34] -0.71 0.48 
Guilt avoidance 3.47 [0.53] 2.90 [0.44] 0.83 0.41 
Team identity 3.89 [0.51] 4.19 [0.49] -0.42 0.68 
Risk Attitude 5.52 [0.70] 5.57 [0.73] -0.14 0.89 
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Team identity = participants’ responses of the extent to which they agree with the sentence, “I considered 
the other participant to be my teammate.” on a 7 point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = very 
much. 
Risk Attitude = participants’ choices in a monetary decision task, in which they were offered an extra 20 
cents.  They decided whether to receive the 20 cents directly, or to invest any portion of the 20 
cents in a risky project, which returns 2.5 times the amount invested with 50 percent chance and 0 
cents with 50 percent chance. 1 = investing 0 cents and 11 = investing 20 cents in the risky project. 
An asterisk indicates a one-tailed p value for testing a directional prediction. 
 
6.4 Interaction Analysis of Two Experiments  
As is discussed above, this study predict and provide evidence that a high level of 
ego stress leads to higher level of cooperation than a low level ego stress. By contrast, a 
high level of external stress leads to lower level of cooperation than a low level of 
external stress. These two predictions may be viewed as an interaction, which suggests 
that the stress level (i.e., high and low levels) and stress type (i.e., ego and external stress 
types) interact to influence individuals’ willingness to cooperate.  Combining the data of 
two experiments, I provide an additional test of this interaction. In this test, I create a 
variable of stress type. I define that stress type equals one for two ego stress conditions in 
experiment one, while stress type equals zero for two external stress conditions in 
experiment two. I create a variable of stress level which equals one for high level stress 
conditions, and zero for low level stress conditions. See figure 2 for the plot of means of 
these four conditions. I perform ANOVA analysis of cooperation with stress type and 
stress level as independent variables.  The results suggests that the interaction of stress 
level and stress type is statistically significant at 0.05 level with a p-value of 0.001. In 
this analysis, the main effects of stress level or stress type is not statistically significant 
with p-values of 0.588 and 0.954 respectively. Table 8 reports the results of ANOVA 
analysis of two experiments. This analysis provides additional support for the prediction 
that the effect of stress level on cooperation depends on the type of stress. 
 63 






















Table 8: ANOVA of two experiments 
 
Factor df Mean Square F p-value 
Stress Level 1 0.067 0.3 0.588 
Stress Type 1 0.000 0 0.954 
Stress level× Stress Type 1 2.553 11.21 0.001 
Error 74 0.228 
   
Notes: 
Stress level equals 1 for conditions that induce a high level of ego or external stress (i.e., HIGHEGO and 
HIGHEXTERNAL), 0 for conditions that induce a low level of ego or external stress (i.e., LOWEGO and 
LOWEXTERNAL). 
Stress type equals 1 for conditions that induce ego stress including both high and low level stress level (i.e., 
HIGHEGO and LOWEGO), 0 for conditions that induce external stress including both high and low stress 
level (i.e., HIGHEXTERNAL and LOWEXTERNAL). 



















CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In this dissertation, I investigate the influence of stress on cooperation.  I argue 
that due to the cognitive appraisal of threat, stress activates the emotion of anxiety, which 
motivates individuals to develop stress coping behaviors.  However, because stress differs 
in the secondary cognitive appraisal, the responsibility of possible failure, different types 
of stressors lead to different stress coping behaviors in collaborative contexts.  Based on 
the responsibility of possible failure, I classify stressors in the workplace into two 
types—ego and external stressors, the former resulting from the threat of failure 
attributed to an individual’s inability and the latter attributed to situations beyond an 
individual’s control.  I that predict ego stress increases cooperation due to the enhanced 
need for affiliations.  In contrast, external stress decreases cooperation due to the 
increased the need to avoid threat. 
I conducted two experiments with online participants to investigate the effects of 
different types of stress on cooperation.  In both experiments, I manipulate stress using 
the directed writing method, in which participants write about stressful situations.  
Specifically, in experiment one, I operationalize high and low levels of ego stress by 
requiring people to describe their weaknesses and strengths respectively.  In experiment 
two, I operationalize high and low levels of external stress by requiring participants to 
write about a situation that they feel most uncertain and certain respectively.  Following 
the directed writing task, participants are paired to make monetary choices in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game, which is framed as whether they choose to contribute to a joint project.  
The results of experiment suggest that while a high level of ego stress leads to higher 
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cooperation rate than a low level of ego stress, a high level  external of external stress 
leads to lower cooperation rate than a low level of external stress. 
My study contributes to the literature in four different ways.  First, my study is the 
first to examine the effect of stress on group cooperation.  The psychology literature 
identifies two kinds of stress coping behaviors, fight-or-flight and tend-and-befriend.  
The theory of fight-or-flight hints that stress may reduce cooperation due to enhanced 
tendency to avoid threat. The theory of tend-and-befriend predicts that stress may 
increase cooperation due to the increased need for affiliations.  To reconcile these 
conflicting predictions, I create a classification scheme of stressors and provide evidence 
that different types of stressors have different effects on cooperation.  Ego stressors, 
which cause individuals to worry about their capabilities, motivate an individual to seek 
affiliations for joint protection and increase cooperation.  External stressors, which cause 
individuals to worry about threat related factors in the environment, motivate people to 
avoid risks and reduces cooperation. 
Second, my study extends the management accounting literature by identifying 
unique motives of cooperation.  While previous studies have identified many economic 
and social motives of cooperation, my dissertation adds to this literature by introducing 
the effect of emotion on cooperation.  This effect is driven by neither economic strategic 
reasoning which involves the expectation of other people’s behavior, nor social 
preferences such as trusting and reciprocity.  This effect is unique in that it is independent 
of any consequential reasoning: stress influences cooperation simply because under stress 
engaging in certain behaviors makes decision makers feel better.  Specifically, ego stress 
increases the need for affiliation, while external stress enhances the need for avoiding 
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threat.  Such needs influence people’s choices unconsciously.  Understanding these 
motives helps researchers understand the antecedence of cooperation in work teams.  
Third, my study points out potential influences of contextual factors and 
management accounting tools on cooperation.  In this paper, I reviewed prior research on 
stressors in the workplace and discussed the relations of these stressors to management 
accounting practices.  I further developed theories of the effects of stressors on 
cooperation.  The theoretical framework of my paper suggests that contextual factors 
such as skill deficiency and uncertainty, and accounting tools such as surveillance induce 
stress and affect cooperation, even when these factors appear irrelevant and are 
independent of employees’ economic incentives.  My study contributes to the literature of 
management control in a collective work environment (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002) by 
identifying many personal, task and environmental variables that influence incentive 
mechanisms in a collaborative environment.   
Fourth, the findings of this research have practical implications for the design of 
control systems.  In a collaborative contexts, organizations trade off two sources of 
inefficiencies: the cost of implementing formal control and the cost of low productivity as 
a result of free-riding. While the results of this study helps companies evaluate the cost of 
low productivity as a result of free-riding, this shed light on the design of control 
systems.  Specifically, organizations may invest in a stronger formal control system such 
as monitoring in situations in which the rate of free-riding is high than in situations in 
which the rate of free-riding is relatively low.  In situations where ego stress is high and 
external stress is low, the rate of free-riding may be low even in the absence of a formal 
control system.  For example, accounting teams faces difficult tasks (high ego stress) and 
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stable environment (low external stress), cooperation levels can be relatively high even 
without formal control mechanisms.  In this case, it is not necessary to implement a 
formal control mechanism.  In contrast, in situations where ego stress is low and external 
stress is high, the rate of free-riding may be high in the absence of a formal control 
system.  For example, sales teams have easy tasks (low ego stress) and face turbulent 
market conditions (high external stress), cooperation levels may be relatively low without 
formal control mechanisms.  In this cases, companies need to incur costs to acquire 
information regarding individuals’ effort level and provide incentive contracts that links 
individual compensation to their effort to promote cooperation.   
This study is subject to a few limitations. First, because stressors are classified 
based on people’s subjective appraisals rather than objective characteristics of stressors, 
this study cannot prescribe classifications for all stressors without further empirical 
testing.  Future research could focus on specific management accounting tools and 
contextual variables and examine their effects on cooperation.  Below, I discuss two 
examples, including performance feedback and incentive contract.   
Performance feedback is an important component of management accounting and 
is shown to have both learning and motivating effects (e.g. Kessler and Ashton 1981; 
Nelson 1993).  Anticipating feedback is stressful for two reasons.  First, as individuals 
perceive that their performance is being evaluated by their supervisors or peers, they 
perceive a threat to their social-image.  Second, as feedback is informative of individuals’ 
effort, skill and/or capabilities in most cases, they perceive a threat to their self-image.  
When individuals further perceive that they themselves are responsible for possibility of 
failure to receive desired feedback, feedback is an ego stressor.  Feedback with different 
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characteristics may poses different levels of stress.  First, the noisiness in performance 
measure reduces the informativeness of feedback on individuals’ effort, skill and 
capabilities, and attenuates the perceived stress.  For example, relative performance 
feedback eliminates the influence of common uncertainties in performance measures.  It 
is expected to induce strong stress and have a strong influence on cooperation. Second, 
the extent to which feedback is available publicly influences the extent to which one’s 
social image is influenced. Therefore, the extent to which feedback is publicly available 
influences the level of stress and its influence on cooperation. Future research could 
examine these hypothesis. 
As another example, incentive contracting practices influence employee 
compensation and induce stress.  A few characteristics of incentive contracts may 
influence stress. First, the noisiness of measures determines whether the possible failure 
to obtain desired payoff is attributed to oneself or to external factors.  Depending on the 
relative salience of these characteristics, one may experience either ego or external stress.  
For performance-contingent contracts with noiseless performance measures, employees 
may worry about their own performance and impose ego stress.  In contrast, stock-based 
compensation plans to low-level employees or incentive contracts with noisy measures, 
cause employees to worry about factors that are beyond their control and impose external 
stress.  Therefore, I expect that performance-contingent contracts increase cooperation, 
while stock-based compensation plans decrease cooperation. Second, the stress is highly 
influenced by the magnitude of economic incentives and the probabilities of obtaining 
desired rewards.  For example, performance contingent contracts, such as relative 
performance contracts and piece rate contracts, are more stressful than fixed wage 
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contracts due to economic incentives.  As another example, for tournament contracts, the 
structure of the tournament, including the number of ranks of rewards, percentage of 
people who will obtain a reward in each rank, and the amount of the reward in each rank, 
influences the competitiveness of the tournament and impact the stress level.  As a result, 
the effect of stress on cooperation changes accordingly.  
The second limitation of the study is that the classification is influenced by 
individual differences. The classification is determined by the cognitive appraisals, which 
is a subjective judgment and is influenced by personality characteristics. That is to say, a 
certain situation may cause ego or external stress for individuals with different 
characteristics.  For example, locus of control may influence the cognitive appraisal of a 
situation, and therefore influences the classification of stressors.  In personality 
psychology, locus of control refers to the extent to which individuals believe that they can 
control events that affect them (Rotter 1966).  Specifically, a person's locus of control is 
conceptualized as either internal or external.  The former means that a person believes 
that they can control their life.  The latter means that the person believe that their 
decisions and life are controlled by environmental factors, chance or fate.  For a 
situations in which the attribution of possible failure is not very clear, individuals’ locus 
of control may influence their cognitive appraisal of responsibility and the type of stress 
they experience. Future research could examine the effect of various stressors on 
cooperation and whether these effects are moderated by the personal characteristics of 
locus of control.      
Another limitation of my study is that I examine settings with only one type of 
stressor. However, in practice, different types of stressors co-exist.  The effect of multiple 
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stressors on cooperation may be dictated by the relative strength of different stressors. 
That is, individuals may react only to the most salient stressor and engage in a 
compensating strategy in response to that stressor.  Conversely, conflicting cues creating 
multiple stressors may make it difficult to identify one strategy.  When using one 
compensating strategy, it may be impossible to satisfy all sources of threats. With the 
absence of an optimal stress coping strategy, the anxiety will occupy limited cognitive 
resources and reduce attention available for the current task (for see a review, Eysenck et 
al. 2007).  As a result, stressed individuals are expected to make more intuitive (as 
opposed to deliberative) decisions than non-stressed.  In a collaborative environment, 
one’s intuitive reaction is to cooperate, because people develop cooperative heuristic in 
the daily life, in which cooperation is generally advantageous (Rand et al. 2012). 
Therefore, the presence of multiple stressors may increase individual’s willingness 
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